

INTRODUCTION

EFFICIENCY

- People have a drive for maximising action efficiency [1]
- If given a choice, people will choose the easier route for themselves [2]
- In joint actions, people will maximise efficiency of joint action, sometimes compromising individual efficiency [3]


FAIRNESS

- People are sensitive to fairness – judge unfair actors harshly, prefer fair interaction partners [4-5]
- Strong reputational motivation to be seen as fair [6-7]
- Little research on whether people *choose* to be fair


How are conflicts between fairness and task efficiency resolved?

Do individuals distribute tasks in a way that maximises overall efficiency or is fairest to both people?


EXPERIMENT 1




N=24



Congruent: $\beta = -1.45$, $SE = 0.08$, $z = -19.30$, $p < .001$ $\beta = -0.02$, $SE = 0.13$, $z = -0.14$, $p = .890$
Equal: $\beta = -0.16$, $SE = 0.06$, $z = -2.77$, $p = .006$ $\beta = 0.26$, $SE = 0.08$, $z = 3.17$, $p = .002$
Incongruent: $\beta = 1.06$, $SE = 0.07$, $z = 15.70$, $p < .001$ $\beta = 0.19$, $SE = 0.13$, $z = 1.45$, $p = .147$




EXPERIMENT 2



N=24

Only unfair to Other - no chance of reciprocity



Congruent: $\beta = -1.84$, $SE = 0.06$, $z = -30.39$, $p < .001$
Equal: $\beta = -0.01$, $SE = 0.04$, $z = -0.25$, $p = .803$
Incongruent: $\beta = 1.77$, $SE = 0.06$, $z = 29.99$, $p < .001$

CONCLUSIONS

- Prioritisation of efficiency in joint actions
- Consistent use of co-efficiency maximising strategy regardless of unfairness
- Even when no chance of reciprocity (no disadvantage to self)
- Joint efficiency over individual efficiency
- Movement speed drops when giving a partner – not oneself – an unfair task distribution
- Hesitating to be unfair but doing it anyway

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